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TO BE JUDGED BY TWELVE OR CARRIED 
BY SIX? QUASI-INVOLUNTARINESS  
AND THE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION OF 
SERVICE MEMBERS FOR THE USE OF 




Post-9/11 conflicts have altered the way that the United States of 
America and her allies fight wars. Over the last ten years military 
commanders have embraced counterinsurgency doctrine as the path to 
victory in the War on Terror. As they have done so, commanders have been 
faced with the difficult task of balancing the need to protect local civilian 
populations with the need to proactively target insurgent fighters. To 
accomplish this mission, the military has adopted rules of engagement that 
allow a service member to engage a target when he or she perceives that the 
target exhibits “hostile intent.” The difficulty in applying this standard in the 
field has been highlighted by a number of high-profile criminal investigations 
 
* J.D., Northwestern Pritzker School of Law, 2015. The author served as an Infantryman 
in the United States Marine Corps from 2004–2008, leaving active duty as a Sergeant. He 
deployed in 2005 as an Infantryman with 3rd Battalion 1st Marines to Al Anbar Province, Iraq 
in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. He redeployed to western Iraq during the surge of 
American forces in 2007 as a team leader with the ground combat element of the 13th Marine 
Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable). I would like to thank my family for their 
unwavering support while I was deployed and as I transitioned out of the Marine Corps into 
my legal career. I would also like to thank Loyola University School of Law professor John 
Dehn for pushing back against my ideas with respect to this piece. This article is dedicated to 
the Marines and Sailors of 3rd Battalion, First Marines who deployed in support of the Global 
War on Terror. 
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that, in some cases, have resulted in service members being convicted of 
homicide offenses for mistakenly engaging civilians. This Comment argues 
that since counterinsurgency has changed targeting doctrine via a change in 
the rules of engagement, the standard for assessing the reasonableness of a 
service member’s decision to use force should also change. Specifically, the 
author maintains that a purely subjective standard, which makes the 
justification question turn on whether the service member acted in good faith, 
is the most appropriate way to analyze the combatant’s decision to use force 
in a counterinsurgency environment. 
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INTRODUCTION 
As a warrior, you might one day face the single most difficult task any person will ever 
have to face: to decide whether to use deadly force and take a life. . . . If you choose to 
take a life when you should not, or if you fail to take a human life when you should, a 
world of hurt will come down on you.1 
 
“Roger, lead victor down, status of Marines inside unknown.” When the 
Marine heard this transmission crackle across the radio from inside his 
 
1 LT. COL. DAVE GROSSMAN, ON COMBAT: THE PSYCHOLOGY AND PHYSIOLOGY OF DEADLY 
CONFLICT IN WAR AND IN PEACE 144 (2004). 
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Humvee, on a crisp, late-fall day in 2005, he had been operating as an 
Infantryman in Haditha, Iraq2 for less than three months. He had been in the 
Marine Corps for barely a year. He was in combat for the first time, and an 
improvised explosive device had just destroyed the vehicle in front of him 
moments before. 
“We gotta find the triggerman,” the Marine’s vehicle commander told 
him, “Dismount now.” 
As the Marine opened the door to the Humvee and bounded toward the 
nearest piece of cover—a small cement curb—his eyes scanned for 
improvised explosive devices. His palms were sweating and his heart was 
racing. His mind was filled with uncertainty. He was uncertain about the 
safety of his comrades inside the downed vehicle, uncertain that he would 
pass the test of combat, and unsure about what lay beyond the raised curb, 
which was the only thing protecting him from a sniper’s bullet.  
He began to scan for targets and a possible location for the enemy fighter 
who had detonated the improvised explosive device. Just ahead, a raised 
berm paralleled the road the Marines were driving on, with several six-foot-
wide underpasses cutting underneath. A perfect hiding spot for a triggerman. 
The Marine’s team leader saw the berm too, and the two Marines instantly 
began bounding toward the underpasses. The junior Marine reached it first 
and, consistent with his training, prepped a M67 fragmentation grenade3 to 
throw into the tunnel before breaching the threshold. But his team leader 
clasped his arm and told him, “No, remember November 19th.” 
The author was the junior Marine in this scenario, which highlights the 
difficulty in determining when to use deadly force in a counterinsurgency 
environment. The date the author’s team leader was referring to, November 
19, involved another squad in the author’s battalion. That squad encountered 
a similar situation, but they made the decision to use deadly force. 
That incident, dubbed by the media as the “Haditha Massacre,”4 led to 
one of the most controversial criminal investigations of a service member’s 
 
2 Haditha is a city located in Al Anbar Province, Iraq. For most of 2005, it was largely 
under the control of foreign fighters. Omer Mahdi & Rory Carroll, Under US Noses, Brutal 
Insurgents Rule Sunni Citadel, GUARDIAN (Aug. 21, 2005 19:09 EDT), http://www.the
guardian.com/world/2005/aug/22/iraq.rorycarroll1, archived at http://perma.cc/C43E-Q7AL. 
3 See M67 Fragmentation Hand Grenade, PROJECT MANAGER CLOSE COMBAT SYS., 
http://www.pica.army.mil/pmccs/combatmunitions/grenades/lethalhand/m67frag.html (last 
visited Nov. 29, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/YHH6-SLTX. The M67 is an anti-
personnel fragmentation grenade that bursts into fragments when detonated. Id. 
4 See James Joyner, Why We Should Be Glad the Haditha Massacre Marine Got No Jail 
Time, ATLANTIC (Jan. 25, 2012, 3:00 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/
2012/01/why-we-should-be-glad-the-haditha-massacre-marine-got-no-jail-time/251993/, 
archived at http://perma.cc/84XC-J462. For a more detailed summary of the Haditha incident, 
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use of force in combat to date, leading to international condemnation of 
American forces.5 In that instance, an improvised explosive device struck the 
Marines’ patrol and they were ambushed.6 The bomb killed one Marine and 
seriously injured two others.7 After locating the source of incoming small-
arms fire, and believing the use of force was authorized under the rules of 
engagement, the Marines counterattacked. In the ensuing confusion, twenty-
four Iraqi civilians were killed. Although none of the combatants were 
ultimately convicted of murder,8 the military filed criminal homicide charges 
against multiple Marines,9 and the subsequent criminal investigation 
dramatically shaped public perception10 of the war and influenced on-the-
ground military decisions for years afterwards.11 
The criminal prosecution of combatants for killing in combat is a 
relatively recent phenomenon. Since the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan, 
military courts have convicted at least twenty-eight service members of 
homicide offenses for using defensive force in combat.12 Fifteen others have 
been prosecuted but later acquitted.13 Before the conflicts in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, the convictions of service members who used deadly force in 
combat, and who in good faith believed such force was necessary, were 
seemingly much less common.14 
 
see Michelle Singer, The Killings in Haditha: Marine Tells 60 Minutes He’s Sorry Civilians 
Were Killed, but Insists He Made Right Decision, 60 MINUTES (Mar. 15, 2007), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/the-killings-in-haditha/, archived at http://perma.cc/QUE4-
RJD5; http://perma.cc/6ZLU-4LS6; http://perma.cc/JVX6-88GP; http://perma.cc/B445-ZE
P5; http://perma.cc/YQ24-87TQ; http://perma.cc/BZH9-EALZ. 
5 See Mary Slosson, Marine Pleads Guilty, Ending Final Haditha Trial, REUTERS (Jan. 23, 
2012, 6:13 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/23/us-marine-haditha-idUSTRE
80M1U620120123, archived at http://perma.cc/2LM7-D6SS. 
6 See Singer, supra note 4. 
7 Id. 
8 Case Dropped Against Officer Accused in Iraq Killings, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2008, at 
A9. 
9 Marine Takes Plea Deal in Killing of 24 Iraqis, USA TODAY, Jan. 24, 2012, at 3A. 
10 See Joyner, supra note 4. 
11 See Rowan Scarborough, Shades of Vietnam: Spike in U.S. Troop Deaths Tied to Stricter 
Rules of Engagement, WASH. TIMES (Dec. 5, 2013), http://www.washingtontimes.
com/news/2013/dec/5/increase-in-battlefield-deaths-linked-to-new-rules/?page=all, archived 
at http://perma.cc/2CVS-GX5G (noting that complaints about civilian causalities have 
generally influenced the application of supporting force in Afghanistan). 
12 See Charlie Savage & Elisabeth Bumiller, An Iraqi Massacre, A Light Sentence and a 
Question of Military Justice, N. Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2012, at A17. 
13 Id. 
14 In prior conflicts, convictions were generally limited to service members who, outside 
the context of an ongoing combat engagement, killed civilians without provocation and 
without any honest belief that the victims were enemy combatants. See, e.g., United States v. 
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The current prosecutions of service members in criminal court for the 
use of force in combat can be attributed in part to a change in the rules of 
engagement, which were formed in response to a changing battlefield.15 In 
previous conflicts against a conventional force, service members were 
authorized to engage enemy combatants based solely on their status as a 
member of the opposing force, known as “status” targeting.16 However, with 
the United States’ recent engagements against irregular forces in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, where enemy combatants blend in with the civilian population, 
service members are now tasked with distinguishing enemies from civilians 
by “conduct.”17 
The U.S. military’s movement from “status-based” targeting to 
“conduct-based” targeting has been a difficult transition.18 In an attempt to 
provide a model for conduct that distinguishes a civilian from an enemy 
combatant, the United States developed rules of engagement that limit a 
service member’s use of force to situations where he or she has positive 
identification of a “hostile act” or “hostile intent.”19 Considering that law 
students in a classroom can debate endlessly whether an individual’s conduct 
is “intentional,” it is no surprise that service members engaged in dynamic 
and chaotic situations have had difficulty determining what conduct 
constitutes “hostile intent.” 
As a result of this ambiguity, in both Iraq and Afghanistan, civilians are 
occasionally killed by U.S. forces after being mistaken as enemy 
 
McMonagle, 38 M.J. 53, 54, 61 (C.M.A. 1993) (reversing the soldier’s conviction for the 
murder of a female civilian during Operation Just Cause, in part, because there was a factual 
issue as to whether the soldier thought he was receiving hostile fire when he fired his weapon); 
United States v. McGhee, 36 C.M.R. 785, 800–01 (N.B.R. 1966) (affirming the murder 
conviction of a Marine that was based, in part, on the jury’s finding that he did not honestly 
believe the Vietnamese civilian was an enemy combatant); William George Eckhardt, My Lai: 
An American Tragedy, 68 UMKC L. REV. 671, 675 (2000) (discussing the My Lai killings that 
occurred in Quang Ngai Province in the Republic of South Vietnam in March of 1968 in which 
American forces were accused of systematically executing approximately 500 non-
combatants). 
15 See Major Eric D. Montalvo, When Did Imminent Stop Meaning Immediate? Jus In 
Bello Hostile Intent, Imminence, and Self-Defense in Counterinsurgency, 2013 ARMY LAW. 
24, 26–29 (2013). 
16 Id. at 30.  
17 Id. at 25. Since insurgent forces blend in with the local population, the only method of 
distinguishing enemy combatants from civilians is conduct amounting to a “hostile action” or 
“hostile intent.” Id. 
18 See id. at 26–27. Moving to a conduct-based targeting model requires Soldiers and 
Marines to distinguish between civilians and combatants within seconds while operating in a 
dynamic combat environment. Id. at 26. As a result, civilian casualties are bound to occur. Id.  
19 Id. at 30–31. 
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combatants.20 In an attempt to deter the use of force against civilians, some 
within the military have advocated for harsh repercussions for violating the 
rules of engagement—even when the combatant was acting in good faith.21 
Such repercussions can include administrative punishment, which may end a 
service member’s career,22 or criminal prosecution for homicide crimes, such 
as murder or manslaughter, in military court.23 
Despite these proponents’ alleged desire to deter excessive use of force 
by punishing rules of engagement violators, the recent prosecutions have 
been relatively limited in scope, potentially minimizing any possible 
deterrent effect. Notwithstanding the fact that the use of drone strikes, close-
air-support, and other supporting arms results in allegedly high numbers of 
civilian casualties,24 the military’s prosecutions have been limited to junior 
enlisted and junior officer ground-service personnel who engage suspected 
combatants with small arms.25 Thus, it is difficult to rationalize the 
prosecutions of ground troops from a deterrence perspective when there 
seemingly has been little punishment of other combatants who also inflict 
civilian casualties, making the pragmatic benefits of these prosecutions 
questionable. 
 
20 Sabrina Tavernise & Andrew W. Lehren, Buffeted by Fury and Chaos, Civilians Paid 
Heaviest Toll, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2010, at A1. 
21 See, e.g., Montalvo, supra note 15, at 34. Major Montalvo argues that prosecuting 
service members who, acting in good faith, violate the Rules of Engagement “accomplishes 
two things: (1) provides opportunities for commanders to conduct more focused ROE training 
based on a substantiated problem and (2) increases the credibility of the commander in the 
eyes of higher headquarters and the public because he accepts responsibility for a mistake and 
takes corrective action.” Id. 
22 See, e.g., Sara A. Carter, Marine’s Career Threatened by Controversial Rules of 
Engagement, WASH. EXAMINER (Jan. 23, 2012, 7:05 PM), http://washingtonexaminer.com/
article/167369, archived at http://perma.cc/Z4SK-A3S3.  
23 See supra notes 4–13 and accompanying text. Any distinction between military courts 
and the civilian criminal justice system is noted where relevant. 
24 Michelle Nichols, Pakistan Tells U.N. at Least 400 Civilians Killed by Drone Strikes, 
REUTERS (Oct. 18, 2013, 7:41 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/10/18/us-un-drones-
idUSBRE99H16Z20131018, archived at http://perma.cc/88X7-4KGW. 
25 See e.g., Associated Press, Clint Lorance Guilty: Army Officer Charged with 2 Counts 
of Murder for Afghanistan Shootings, WORLD POST (Aug. 1, 2013, 9:25 PM), http://www.
huffingtonpost.com/2013/08/01/army-officer-found-guilty_n_3692757.html, archived at 
http://perma.cc/6AXZ-MAT6 (reporting that a United States Army 1st Lieutenant was found 
guilty of murder when he ordered his soldiers to engage two individuals he believed were 
exhibiting hostile intent); Marine Charged with Murder in Fallujah Killing, SFGATE (Aug. 
21, 2007, 4:00 AM), http://www.sfgate.com/news/article/Marine-charged-with-murder-in-
Fallujah-killing-2508908.php, archived at http://perma.cc/PBZ5-8PA5 (reporting on a Marine 
Sergeant charged with murder for violating the rules of engagement during combat operations 
in Fallujah, Iraq). 
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Additionally, prosecuting combatants for traditional homicide crimes 
poses a number of doctrinal problems, and there are signs that military courts 
are uncomfortable with prosecuting service members under self-defense 
standards for actions in combat. The United States Supreme Court recently 
denied certiorari to the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, which asked 
whether a service member loses his right to self-defense as a matter of law 
when he, without legal authorization, points his weapon at a suspected enemy 
combatant.26 The confusion among military courts is an indication that 
criminal law doctrine as currently applied to combat engagements might be 
ill-suited for counterinsurgency. But given that most military commanders 
accept the notion that the United States will likely engage in 
counterinsurgency conflicts in the future,27 military courts must be prepared 
to apply criminal law to combat engagements in a counterinsurgency 
environment. This can be done, but it will require some doctrinal evolution 
in order to keep in step with the evolution of modern combat. 
This Comment will focus on the appropriate standard for assessing the 
“reasonableness” of a combatant’s decision to use force. In each case of an 
alleged rules of engagement violation, both the actus reus and the mens rea 
will often be satisfied: it is usually known that the defendant did the killing, 
satisfying the actus reus of a homicide crime, and it is usually surmised that 
when a service member uses force in combat against an enemy combatant he 
intends to kill or cause great bodily injury to the suspected enemy fighter, 
satisfying mens rea. In these circumstances, a combatant will most likely 
have to argue that his use of force was justified under the rules of 
engagement.28 Thus, the key inquiry will likely be whether it was 
“reasonable” for the combatant to conclude that he was authorized to use 
deadly force. 
Courts and reviewing officers analyze the reasonableness of a service 
member’s use of force in much the same manner that a civilian jury assesses 
the reasonableness of a criminal defendant’s self-defense claim.29 Currently, 
 
26 United States v. Behenna, 71 M.J. 228, 230 (C.A.A.F. 2012), reconsideration denied, 
71 M.J. 375 (C.A.A.F. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2765 (U.S. 2013). 
27 See U.S. DEP’T OF THE ARMY, THE U.S. ARMY/MARINE CORPS COUNTERINSURGENCY 
FIELD MANUAL, at li (2007) (noting that since “[t]he United States possesses overwhelming 
conventional military superiority . . . [t]his capability has pushed its enemies to fight U.S. 
forces unconventionally, mixing modern technology with ancient techniques of insurgency 
and terrorism”). 
28 Although a mistake-of-fact instruction would seem appropriate, as opposed to a self-
defense instruction, in none of the cases analyzed in this Comment did military courts offer a 
mistake-of-fact instruction to the jury. The rationale behind this is unclear. 
29 See Montalvo, supra note 15, at 30. Major Montalvo notes a service member’s use of 
force, similar to the common law general intent standard, must be both “honest and 
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when assessing the reasonableness of a defendant combatant’s use of force, 
military courts apply Rule for Court Martial 916(e), which—like traditional 
self-defense doctrine—requires a defendant’s use of force to be both 
subjectively and objectively reasonable.30 
But much as the current rules of engagement have evolved to allow 
combatants to engage in “conduct-based” targeting, the standard of review 
for assessing the reasonableness of a combatant’s use of force must too 
evolve. This can best be accomplished by analyzing the “reasonableness” of 
a service member’s use of force with a purely subjective standard, much like 
courts do for the defense for battered persons (referenced in this Comment as 
the “battered woman defense”). Unlike the dual standard currently used by 
the military courts, which asks both whether the defendant honestly believed 
use of force was necessary and whether that belief was reasonable, the purely 
subjective standard only asks whether the actor honestly believed the use of 
force was necessary.31 
In a combat environment, an objective standard is inappropriate because 
it assumes an actor’s actions are completely voluntary.32 The rules of 
engagement, and the obligation placed on combatants to use deadly force in 
order to accomplish their mission, will be shown to make the combatant’s 
 
reasonable.” Id. at 31. See also Kim Murphy, Soldier is Cleared in Afghanistan Shooting, L.A. 
TIMES, Aug. 10, 2012, at AA2. In dismissing charges against an Army Sergeant who shot and 
killed an Afghani woman in the middle of a firefight, the reviewing officer determined a 
“reasonable person” would have thought the service member’s use of force was necessary. Id. 
30 See Lt. Colonel Randall Bagwell, The Threat Assessment Process (TAP): The Evolution 
of Escalation of Force, 2008 ARMY LAW. 5, 12 (2008). The standard for assessing the 
reasonableness of a Soldier’s use of force is objective, in accordance with the Manual for 
Courts-Martial, United States, RCM 916(e) (2008), which states: 
It is a defense to a homicide, assault involving deadly force, or battery involving deadly force that 
the accused: (A) Apprehended, on reasonable grounds, that death or grievous bodily harm was 
about to be inflicted wrongfully on the accused; and (B) Believed that the force the accused used 
was necessary for protection against death or grievous bodily harm. 
31 Kevin Jon Heller, Beyond the Reasonable Man? A Sympathetic but Critical Assessment 
of the Use of Subjective Standards of Reasonableness in Self-Defense and Provocation Cases, 
26 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 56 (1998). 
32 Id. at 14. Heller notes that the objective standard asks only whether “a reasonable person 
in defendant’s circumstances would have perceived self-defense as necessary” and thus would 
have killed in self-defense, not whether the person who actually killed in self-defense could 
have avoided doing so. The objective standard embraced . . . therefore, is necessarily 
predicated upon a presumption of free will. Id. (citation omitted). See also Donald L. Creach, 
Note, Partially Determined Imperfect Self-Defense: The Battered Wife Kills and Tells Why, 
34 STAN. L. REV. 615, 617 (1982) (“[The objective standard] assumes people can choose how 
to respond to an apparent attack. If a defendant tries to explain that her response was partially 
caused by external conditions, self-defense doctrine does not know what to make of that 
explanation.”). 
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use of force somewhere between pure voluntary and involuntary action, or 
“quasi-involuntary,” and thus incompatible with an objective analysis.33 The 
subjective standard, which hinges on the “good faith”34 of the actor, allows 
courts to reconcile this dilemma while still holding accountable those service 
members who use force in bad faith. 
Part I of this Comment describes the counterinsurgency environment to 
illustrate the difficult and ambiguous use of force decisions troops must make 
in modern combat. Part II discusses how the rules of engagement developed 
into a “conduct-based” standard—in response to counterinsurgency 
conflicts—that hinges on an individual service member’s own perception of 
his or her environment. Part III explores the various potential standards for 
assessing the reasonableness of a combatant’s use of force, addressing the 
inadequacies of each. Part IV argues that assessing the reasonableness of a 
combatant’s actions from a purely subjective standard, which hinges on good 
faith, is most compatible with the current rules of engagement and modern 
combat. In addition, the rules of engagement, the combatant’s legal 
obligations to obey orders, and the counterinsurgency environment will be 
shown to make a service member’s conduct quasi-involuntary, and thus 
incompatible with an intentionalist-based objective standard. Part V is 
dedicated to addressing the policy concerns associated with a purely 
subjective standard. 
I. COUNTERINSURGENCY WARFARE 
Since September 11, 2001, the nature of combat has changed, with the 
American military engaging in nation-building and insurgency suppression 
in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Military commanders agree that, due to the 
technological superiority of the United States over most of its adversaries, 
future conflicts will likely involve American forces engaging in some sort of 
counterinsurgency campaign.35 Both military tactics and the rules of 
 
33 Creach, supra note 32, at 617. 
34 In Moor v. Licciardello, the Supreme Court of Delaware noted the Delaware Criminal 
Commentary states that for the subjective, “good faith” standard:  
[a]ll that is relevant to the actor’s guilt is that he did honestly believe it necessary to use force in 
his own defense . . . . [I]f he honestly believes he needs to act in self-defense, the criminal law will 
be powerless to stop him, no matter how unreasonable his belief. It is best, then, that the official 
statement of the law be realistic. 
463 A.2d 268, 272 (Del. 1983). The court also noted that a subjective standard for 
reasonableness in the context of self-defense makes self-defense doctrine consistent with 
mistake-of-fact doctrine, which under Delaware statutory law only requires a mistake to be 
subjectively reasonable. Id. 
35 See U.S. DEP’T OF THE ARMY, supra note 27, at 1. 
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engagement have been forced to adapt, to a certain extent, in order to 
effectively fight counterinsurgency conflicts. 
An insurgency is “an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a 
constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict.”36 
In the classic insurgency environment, the enemy exploits the local 
population by blending in with noncombatants.37 By doing so, the insurgent 
prevents the technologically superior opponent from identifying him and 
engaging him based on his status as a combatant.38 As a result, the insurgent 
gains the initiative and is able to determine when to engage the 
technologically superior force. Counterinsurgency, on the other hand, or 
“COIN,” is “military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and 
civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency.”39 At the center of 
counterinsurgency is a struggle for political power, with insurgents seeking 
to undermine the current power while counterinsurgents seek to support it.40 
According to U.S. COIN doctrine, long-term victory in COIN conflicts 
hinges on the local population taking charge of their own security and 
governance.41 In order to achieve this goal, the counterinsurgent must gain 
the trust of the civilian populace.42 This trust reduces the insurgent’s ability 
to exploit the population for concealment and intelligence purposes and 
increases the occupying forces’ ability to engage in effective nation-building 
efforts, which in turn, enables the country to take control of its own security. 
Mitigating civilian casualties is a fundamental principle of COIN 
doctrine, as civilian casualties erode the local population’s trust in the 
occupying force.43 Cutting against the desire to protect civilian causalities, 
however, are commanders’ obligations to protect their troops against enemy 
action. Troop protection serves the additional purpose of maintaining public 
support for the conflict at home.44 Such support is necessary to achieve 
success, as most COIN conflicts require significant time and financial 
resources.45 
Balancing the need to eliminate the enemy who blends in with the 
civilian population with the need to protect the civilian population from harm 
 
36 Id. at 2. 
37 See id. at 4. 
38 See id. 
39 Id. at 2. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. 
42 See id. at 42–43. 
43 See id. at 43–44. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. at 43. 
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creates difficulties for commanders. In traditional symmetrical conflicts, 
where one uniformed nation force is fighting another uniformed nation force, 
combatants may engage each other based on “status”46: once a combatant 
identifies a member of the opposing force, he can engage him at any time 
regardless of the individual’s conduct.47 In the COIN environment, where the 
enemy and the civilian population are indistinguishable, the “status-based” 
model of targeting is impossible to implement. COIN instead requires the 
service member to engage in a “conduct-based” targeting analysis, basing his 
determination to use force on the perceived threat’s actions.48 
This creates a dynamic, and inherently obscure, environment for ground 
forces to operate in, which in turn distorts their subjective perception of that 
environment. Troops patrolling a street could one day be dropping off paper 
and pencils at a neighborhood school, and the next day be locked in pitched 
combat on that very same street.49 This situation forces individual 
combatants, who must attempt to distinguish civilians from combatants, to 
engage in an ad-hoc analysis at a moment’s notice in built-up residential 
areas. 
II. THE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT 
In response to the requirement for soldiers and Marines to engage in 
“conduct”-based targeting in the COIN environment, commanders were 
forced to adjust the rules of engagement for the conflicts in Iraq and 
Afghanistan.50 According to the Dictionary of Military and Associated 
Terms, rules of engagement (ROE) are “directives issued by competent 
military authority that delineate the circumstances and limitations under 
which United States forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement 
with other forces encountered.”51 The ROE are supposed to “‘give 
operational and tactical military leaders greater control over the execution of 
 
46 See Montalvo, supra note 15, at 30. 
47 Id. 
48 See id. 
49 See U.S. DEP’T OF THE ARMY, supra note 27, at 242 (“Success in COIN operations 
requires small-unit leaders agile enough to transition among many types of missions and able 
to adapt to change. They must be able to shift through a number of activities from nation 
building to combat and back again in days, or even hours.”). 
50 See generally Montalvo, supra note 15, at 30 (noting that the U.S. military has moved 
from status-based to conduct-based targeting). 
51 U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, JOINT PUB. 1-02, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DICTIONARY OF 
MILITARY AND ASSOCIATED TERMS 221–22 (Aug. 15, 2014), available at http://www.dtic.
mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/PZA9-TQ68; see also 
Montalvo, supra note 15, at 24. 
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combat operations.’ It is important to recognize that ROE are . . . military 
directives.”52 
In an attempt to achieve the appropriate balance between force 
protection and civilian protection, military commanders in Iraq and 
Afghanistan developed an ROE that has gone through significant change over 
the last decade.53 The predecessor to the current ROE was first developed by 
the military for American forces in 1981.54 Between 1981 and 2004, every 
form of the ROE reiterated that forces have the inherent right to self-defense 
when troops are faced with an imminent threat of “hostile intent.”55 However, 
the rules of engagement provided no further explanation of the word 
“imminent.”56 In 2005, in light of the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan and 
the move to conduct-based targeting, military commanders changed the ROE 
and provided an expanded definition of the word “imminent.” This ROE 
defined hostile intent as: 
The threat of imminent use of force against the United States, U.S. forces or other 
designated persons or property. It is also the threat of force to preclude or impede the 
mission and/or duties of U.S. forces, including the recovery of U.S. personnel or vital 
USG property . . . [t]he determination of whether the use of force against U.S. forces is 
 
52 Montalvo, supra note 15, at 28 (quoting GEOFFREY S. CORN ET AL., THE LAW OF ARMED 
CONFLICT: AN OPERATIONAL APPROACH 126 (2012)). 
53 See id. at 28–29. Major Montalvo identifies four definitions of hostile intent prior to the 
current Rules of Engagement, in chronological order: 
1. Worldwide Peacetime ROE for Seaborne Forces, 1981 
Hostile Intent—The threat of the imminent use of force by a foreign force against the United States 
or U.S. forces . . . where the hostile intent amounts to a threat of imminent attack, the right exists 
to use proportional force in self-defense by all authorized means available. 
2. JCS Peacetime Rules of Engagement, 26 June 1986 
Hostile Intent—Hostile intent is the threat of the imminent use of force . . . [w]here there is 
preparation for imminent use of armed force, the right exists to use proportional force, including 
armed force, in self-defense by all authorized means available . . . . 
3. CJCSI 3121.01, JCS Standing Rules of Engagement, 1 Oct 1994 
Hostile Intent—Hostile intent is the threat of imminent use of force by a foreign force or terrorist 
unit (organization or individual) against the United States . . . [w]hen hostile intent is present, the 
right exists to use proportional force, including armed force, in self-defense by all necessary means 
available to deter or neutralize the potential attacker or, if necessary, to destroy the threat. 
4. CJCSI 3121.01A, Standing Rules of Engagement for US Forces, 15 January 2000 
Hostile Intent—The threat of imminent use of force against the United States, U.S. forces, 
and . . . the threat of force to preclude or impede the mission and/or duties of U.S. forces, including 
the recovery of U.S. personnel or vital USG property. 
 Id. at 35. 
54 Id. at 28. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. 
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imminent will be based on an assessment of all facts and circumstances known to U.S. 
forces at the time and may be made at any level. Imminent does not necessarily mean 
immediate or instantaneous.57 
This definition of imminent, expanded to include threats that are not 
necessarily “immediate or instantaneous,” broadens the scope of “hostile 
intent” to include conduct that under the pre-2005 definition of “hostile 
intent” may not have authorized the use of deadly force. It enables service 
members to engage threats before being in immediate danger of being fired 
upon, but also increases the likelihood of civilian casualties. 
Under the new ROE, in order to determine if “hostile intent” exists, 
service members engage in a situational-based analysis that hinges on their 
subjective interpretation of a number of factors.58 Factors in this totality of 
the circumstances-like analysis may include the following: the military 
intelligence available to the shooter, the potential threat’s noncompliance 
with verbal commands, the location of a potential threat’s hands, the potential 
threat’s maneuvering into a position to gain a tactical advantage, his general 
nervousness, and his possession of weapons while engaging in furtive 
behavior.59 However, no factor standing alone can be dispositive of hostile 
intent.60 
In a dynamic combat environment, when troops have moments to decide 
whether to use force and must base that determination on their subjective 
interpretation of conduct, they are bound to make some mistakes. Some 
commentators suggest, as a possible solution to this problem, to move to a 
purely objective ROE, which draws a bright line between “no-go” and “go” 
use of force scenarios.61 But given that COIN environments require troops to 
engage in a conduct-based targeting scheme to distinguish civilians from 
enemy combatants in a moment’s notice, moving away from a conduct-based 
ROE seems unlikely. 
 
57 Id. at 35 (emphasis added). Note the additional definition of “imminent use of force” is 
the most recent version of the ROE. This addition essentially turns an objective analysis into 
a subjective one. 
58 See id. at 35. The current ROE states that an assessment of whether the use of force is 
needed is based on all facts and circumstances known to the service member at the time. Id. 
59 See Bagwell, supra note 30, at 12.  
60 Id. 
61 See, e.g., Montalvo, supra note 15, at 34 (arguing for a return to the pre-2005 definition 
of “imminence” that, he argues, would reduce the chances of service members erroneously 
using deadly force). 
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III. SELF-DEFENSE LAW AND THE REASONABLE PERSON 
Which brings us to the next question: if the ROE dictates the 
combatant’s use of force decision before the trigger is squeezed, how should 
courts go about assessing the reasonableness of that decision? Substantial 
scholarship has been devoted to the various methods of analyzing the 
reasonableness of a civilian actor’s conduct when using defensive force in a 
domestic setting.62 Yet there has been limited, if any, discussion about the 
appropriate standard for analyzing the reasonableness of a combatant’s use 
of force while engaged in combat. 
Civilian criminal law courts have long struggled with how best to judge 
the “reasonableness” of an individual’s use of defensive force.63 When 
assessing the reasonableness of a defendant’s use of force, most American 
jurisdictions employ one of three standards.64 First, the majority of 
jurisdictions—including U.S. military courts65—apply a dual standard, 
requiring an actor to subjectively believe his use of force was justified and 
that the actor’s use of force be “objectively reasonable.”66 Second, some 
jurisdictions apply a purely objective standard, disregarding the actor’s 
subjective state of mind.67 Third, a minority of jurisdictions apply a purely 
 
62 See, e.g., Heller, supra note 31, at 103 (analyzing various standards of reasonableness 
before noting the purely subjective standard assumes that individuals cannot avoid acting upon 
an honest belief that self-defensive action is required); Steffani J. Saitow, Note, Battered 
Woman Syndrome: Does the “Reasonable Battered Woman” Exist?, 19 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. 
& CIV. CONFINEMENT 329 (1993); Robert Unikel, “Reasonable” Doubts: A Critique of the 
Reasonable Woman Standard in American Jurisprudence, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 326 (1992). 
63 See John F. Wagner Jr., Annotation, Standard for Determination of Reasonableness of 
Criminal Defendant’s Belief, for Purposes of Self-Defense Claim, That Physical Force Is 
Necessary—Modern Cases, 73 A.L.R. 4th 993, 996–97 (1989) (indicating that courts have 
identified three separate standards for assessing the reasonableness of a defendant’s use of 
force). 
64 Id. 
65 See Bagwell, supra note 30, and accompanying text. 
66 See, e.g., Hall v. United States, 46 F.3d 855, 857 (8th Cir. 1995) (“To sustain the 
defense, the jury would have to find that Hall used ‘such force that he reasonably believe[d] 
[was] necessary to protect himself from unlawful physical harm about to be inflicted upon him 
by another.’” (citation omitted)). 
67 See, e.g., State v. Stewart, 763 P.2d 572, 579 (Kan. 1988) (“We first use a subjective 
standard to determine whether the defendant sincerely and honestly believed it necessary to 
kill in order to defend. We then use an objective standard to determine whether defendant’s 
belief was reasonable—specifically, whether a reasonable person in defendant’s 
circumstances would have perceived self-defense as necessary.”). The Military Manual for 
Courts-Martial adopts a similar standard, with jury instructions indicating the first prong is an 
objective prong, noting that: 
[T]he accused’s apprehension of death or grievous bodily harm must have been one which a 
reasonable, prudent person would have held under the circumstances. Because this test is objective, 
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subjective standard, without any objective limitations.68 
A. THE DUAL STANDARD 
Under the dual standard, a defendant must have actually and honestly 
believed deadly force was necessary to protect him or herself, and that belief 
must be one that a reasonable person would have held under the 
circumstances.69 Thus, even if an actor honestly and in good faith believes 
his or her life is in danger, if that belief is not objectively reasonable from the 
standard of a “reasonable person,” the actor’s self-defense claim fails. 
Courts have historically struggled to define a “reasonable person.”70 
This objective inquiry has caused the “reasonable person” standard to be 
criticized as a vehicle for juries to project social, political, and racial bias on 
the individual defendant’s “situation.”71 This is because assessing an actor’s 
 
such matters as intoxication or emotional instability of the accused are irrelevant. On the other 
hand, such matters as the relative height, weight, and general build of the accused and the alleged 
victim, and the possibility of safe retreat are ordinarily among the circumstances which should be 
considered in determining the reasonableness of the apprehension of death or grievous bodily 
harm. 
MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, RCM 916(e) (2012). However the second 
prong is subjective; “[a]ccordingly, such matters as the accused’s emotional control, 
education, and intelligence are relevant in determining the accused’s actual belief as to the 
force necessary to repel the attack.” Id. 
68 See, e.g., State v. Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d 811, 818 (N.D. 1983) (stating that “[a] 
defendant’s conduct” in relation to a claim of self-defense is not to be judged by what an 
objectively reasonable person would do under like circumstances as the defendant, but what 
the defendant “himself in good faith honestly believed and had reasonable ground to believe 
was necessary for him to do to protect himself from apprehended death or great bodily injury.”)  
(quoting State v. Hazlett, 113 N.W. 374, 380 (N.D. 1907) (internal quotation marks omitted)); 
see also State v. Thomas, 468 N.E.2d 763, 765 (Ohio Ct. App. 1983) (“[I]t seems now to be 
finally determined that guilt is personal, and that the conduct of any individual is to be 
measured by that individual’s equipment mentally and physically. He may act in self-defense, 
not only when a reasonable person would so act, but when one with the particular qualities 
that the individual himself has would so do.”) (quoting Nelson v. State, 181 N.E. 448, 449 
(Ohio Ct. App. 1932) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
69 See Stewart, 763 P.2d at 579. 
70 People v. Goetz, 497 N.E.2d 41 (N.Y. 1986). In Goetz, the defendant shot four African-
American youths on a subway after they approached him and requested five dollars. Id. at 43. 
The New York intermediate appeals court majority found that “reasonableness” should be 
determined by the actor’s perception of the situation. Id. at 46. In dissent, one justice argued 
that “reasonableness” should be assessed from the perspective of an objective person who is 
similarly situated to the defendant. Id. On appeal, the New York Court of Appeals rejected the 
intermediate court’s majority opinion and held that “reasonableness” should be an objective 
inquiry that takes into account the defendant’s individual perceptions of the situation. Id. at 
52. 
71 See Kit Kinports, So Much Activity, So Little Change: A Reply to the Critics of Battered 
Women’s Self-Defense, 23 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 155, 167 (2004). 
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“situation” from the perspective of a notional third person requires jurors to 
construct their own hypothetical “reasonable person,” which may lead to 
individual juror bias inadvertently discriminating against the defendant.72 
The objective prong of the dual standard is also predicated on the 
assumption that the actor’s decision to use force was wholly voluntary or that 
an option besides the use of force was available.73 Criminal law doctrine 
generally follows an intentionalist model, seeking only to punish individuals 
for purely voluntary acts.74 Under the objective test, the question is whether 
a “reasonable person” would have thought self-defense was necessary, and 
not whether the person who actually killed in self-defense could have avoided 
using defensive force.75 Thus, under the objective standard there is an implicit 
irrebuttable presumption that the defendant’s actions were wholly 
voluntary.76 This irrebuttable presumption makes the objective standard 
difficult to apply fairly in situations where the decision to use deadly force is 
either involuntary or not entirely voluntary. 
Under the subjective prong of the dual standard, the defendant must 
have honestly believed the use of force was necessary. The nuances of the 
subjective prong are discussed below in the context of the purely subjective 
standard. 
B. THE PURELY SUBJECTIVE STANDARD 
Some courts choose to avoid the problems involved with jurors 
attempting to apply a notional “reasonable person” to a defendant’s situation 
by adopting a purely subjective standard of reasonableness.77 In addition, a 
purely subjective standard avoids the irrebuttable presumption of 
“voluntariness” implicit in the objective inquiry.78 Currently, four states 
 
72 See Heller, supra note 31, at 4; Kinports, supra note 71, at 167; Martha Minow, Stripped 
Down Like a Runner or Enriched by Experience: Bias and Impartiality of Judges and Jurors, 
33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1201, 1208 (1992). 
73 See Creach, supra note 32, at 617 (noting that the criminal law only punishes voluntary 
acts, and traditional self-defense doctrine presumes voluntary action). 
74 See Heller, supra note 31, at 14; see also Lauren E. Goldman, Note, Nonconfrontational 
Killings and the Appropriate Use of Battered Child Syndrome Testimony: The Hazards of 
Subjective Self-Defense and the Merits of Partial Excuse, 45 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 185, 225 
(1994) (noting that in some jurisdictions, when a defendant’s actions are not entirely voluntary, 
less serious charges and punishments may be imposed). 
75 Heller, supra note 31, at 14. 
76 See id. 
77 See id. at 57, 59. 
78 See id. at 59–60. 
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employ a purely subjective analysis when determining the reasonableness of 
defendant’s use of force.79 
Under the subjective standard, the defendant’s culpability turns on his 
own honest belief that the use of force was necessary.80 Courts that have 
applied a subjective standard, as opposed to an objective one, avoid the 
presumption of voluntariness embedded in the objective inquiry.81 These 
courts note that when an actor is placed in a situation where he believes the 
use of force is necessary to prevent death or grievous bodily harm, the actor’s 
desire to survive creates a situation where he has no choice but to use deadly 
force.82 Thus, the question should not be whether the actor should have used 
deadly force, but rather whether he honestly believed such force was 
necessary. If the defendant had such a belief, he would have no choice but to 
act and punishing him for that action would be at odds with the American 
criminal law’s voluntariness requirement.83 
Some critics of a subjective standard argue that it weakens the force of 
homicide law and gives defendants carte blanche to use excessive defensive 
force.84 But this is an oversimplification. Proponents of the objective standard 
assume the force of law influences the decisions of actors in life-or-death 
scenarios. Yet when an actor is in honest fear of his or her life, rational 
behavior cannot be expected. This makes the potential deterrence effect of an 
objective standard minimal at best. In comparison, the subjective standard 
only holds accountable the defendant who consciously acted in bad faith. 
Such actions are wholly voluntary and can be deterred with the appropriate 
punishment. 
Additionally, critics of the subjective standard assume that just because 
a defendant claims he was in fear of his life, an acquittal will come easily. 
However, this is not necessarily the case. In most jurisdictions, the burden is 
on the defendant to prove his or her self-defense claim.85 Proving the 
defendant’s own subjective belief is a task that poses numerous evidentiary 
 
79 Id. at 57 (noting that Delaware, Kentucky, North Dakota, and Ohio are the only states 
to employ a purely subjective standard when assessing the reasonableness of a defendant’s use 
of force). 
80 See, e.g., Moor v. Licciardello, 463 A.2d 268, 272 (Del. 1983) (citing DEL. CODE ANN. 
tit. 11, § 464). 
81 See Heller, supra note 31, at 59–60. 
82 See Moor, 463 A.2.d at 272; People v. Lennon, 38 N.W. 871, 872 (Mich. 1888) (“To 
hold [an objective standard] would be to set at naught, and to rule at variance with, the well-
known laws of human nature . . . .”). 
83 See U.S. DEP’T OF THE ARMY, supra note 27, at 14. 
84 See, e.g., Heller, supra note 31, at 65. 
85 Jeffrey F. Ghent, Annotation, Homicide: Modern Status of Rules as to Burden and 
Quantum of Proof to Show Self-Defense, 43 A.L.R. 3d 221, 226 (1972). 
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challenges, often requiring the defendant to take the stand, subjecting him or 
her to cross-examination. 
At first glance, jurors may seem ill-equipped to assess the state of mind 
of the actor at the time he used force. However, jurors are tasked with 
engaging in the same sort of analysis when they are asked to determine if a 
defendant satisfies the mens rea requirement of a criminal offense. And 
asking a juror to assess the honesty of a defendant is simpler than asking a 
juror to assess the reasonableness of a defendant’s actions from a notional 
third person perspective as it more naturally fits the jury’s primary role of 
evaluating the credibility and truthfulness of witness testimony.86 This is 
because the subjective standard hinges on what the actor honestly and in fact 
believed at the time of the engagement, which makes the testimony of the 
defendant crucial to any claim of self-defense. Thus, the subjective standard 
gives jurors the opportunity to do what they do best: assess the credibility of 
witness testimony.87 
C. THE PURELY SUBJECTIVE STANDARD AND THE BATTERED WOMAN 
DEFENSE 
Although only four jurisdictions employ a purely subjective standard of 
reasonableness for all defensive force cases, many jurisdictions have adopted 
an essentially purely subjective standard of “reasonableness” in instances 
where the defendant suffers from battered woman’s syndrome.88 The classic 
case of State v. Leidholm highlights the justifications for such a standard. 
There the defendant had been involved in an abusive relationship for a 
number of years and was often subjected to violence by her spouse.89 On the 
night of the killing, after both the defendant and the victim had been drinking, 
the two were involved in an argument.90 But the argument subsided and the 
defendant’s husband fell asleep.91 Fearful that her husband would inflict 
grievous bodily harm on her after he woke,92 the defendant stabbed her 
husband to death while he slept.93 In holding a subjective standard was 
appropriate for the defendant’s self-defense claim the court noted, 
 
86 See Heller, supra note 31, at 59 (noting that “lie-detection” is the normal function of the 
jury, making the subjective standard of reasonableness much easier for jurors to apply than 
the objective standard).  
87 See id. 
88 See, e.g., State v. Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d 811, 818 (N.D. 1983). 
89 Id. at 813. 
90 Id. at 813–14. 
91 Id. at 814. 
92 See id. at 818–19. 
93 Id. 
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The significance of the difference in viewing circumstances from the standpoint of the 
“defendant alone” rather than from the standpoint of a “reasonably cautious person” is 
that the jury’s consideration of the unique physical and psychological characteristics of 
an accused allows the jury to judge the reasonableness of the accused’s actions against 
the accused’s subjective impressions of the need to use force rather than against those 
impressions which a jury determines that a hypothetical reasonably cautious person 
would have under similar circumstances.94 
Other courts have endorsed the Leidholm-type analysis in similar 
situations,95 indicating that:  
the defendant’s actions are to be judged against her own subjective impressions and not 
those which a detached jury might determine to be objectively reasonable. The jury is 
to consider whether the petitioner reasonably believed that she was in imminent danger 
of death or great bodily harm, in light of all the facts and circumstances known to her.96 
 Although, similar to the objective standard, the subjective standard uses 
the term “reasonably believed,” courts have held that the “reasonableness” in 
the case of battered woman’s syndrome is judged from the position of the 
accused, as opposed to a notional “reasonable person.”97 
The rationale behind this subtle change is simple. Self-defense 
standards, when measured from an objective standpoint, follow an 
intentionalist model.98 Thus, the objective standard assumes a defendant 
perceived that he had a choice in his course of action, and thus weighed those 
choices and acted purely voluntarily when deciding to use defensive force. A 
purely voluntary action is relatively simple for a third party—in this instance 
the trier of fact—to analyze from an objective standpoint because no inquiry 
into the actor’s state of mind is necessary. The trier of fact can simply look 
at the choices that were presented to the actor at the time of the action, and 
determine if the choice he made was objectively reasonable. In much the 
same way, a wholly involuntary action is just as simple for a juror to evaluate 
from an objective standard. For example, if another person pushes a 
defendant into a victim, causing the victim to fall to his death, it is easy to 
surmise that the defendant’s involuntary action does not warrant criminal 
liability because, although he may have fallen into the victim, he made no 
choice to do so. But in between purely voluntary and involuntary action lays 
 
94 Id. at 818. 
95 In Tourlakis v. Morris, the court noted that appellate court decisions from twenty-one 
states and the District of Columbia reflected an acceptance of the battered woman defense, 
while only six states had expressly refused to adopt the rule. 738 F. Supp. 1128, 1133 (S.D. 
Ohio 1990). 
96 State v. Kelly, 685 P.2d 564, 570–71 (Wash. 1984) (en banc) (citations and internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
97 See, e.g., Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d at 818. 
98 See Heller, supra note 31, at 14. 
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a third category of conduct with which the intentionalist model of criminal 
law struggles.99 In this quasi-involuntary category of conduct, an actor has a 
choice between action and inaction, but external factors, perceived only by 
the actor, force him or her to make what could be considered an objectively 
unreasonable decision.100 
The battered woman falls into this category.101 In her case, she has the 
option of retreating from her home between bouts of domestic violence or 
using deadly force in self-defense. But external factors leave the woman often 
feeling like she has no choice at all. Retreat is often not an option for her 
because the violence is occurring in her home, which is supposed to be her 
place of safety. She could call the police, but law enforcement intervention 
in domestic violence situations is often unsuccessful, with officers reluctant 
to arrest in minor instances of violence, and prosecutors sometimes reluctant 
to prosecute.102 These external factors result in the woman being trapped in a 
state of helplessness,103 with no other realistic option but to defend herself 
 
99 Id. at 81–87. 
100 Id. at 87. 
101 Id. at 86–87. 
102 See Creach, supra note 32, at 630 & n.74 (noting that commentators have widely 
established the inadequacy of the criminal justice system in protecting victims of domestic 
violence). 
103 See Jimmie E. Tinsley, Criminal Law: The Battered Woman Defense, 34 AM. JUR. 
PROOF OF FACTS 2D 11–12 (1983). Tinsley notes: 
Battered women generally have a low self-esteem and tend to have traditional views concerning 
family relationships and roles. Battered women often feel shame and guilt, acting on the premise 
that they themselves are somehow responsible for the violence inflicted on them. They tend to be 
both emotionally and economically dependent on their husbands, and thus are unable to leave 
them. Battering men also tend to suffer from low esteem and to have traditional views regarding 
roles in the family. Battering men tend to alternate between periods of violence and periods of 
kindness, and often do not believe that they are particularly violent or have a particularly bad 
temper. Battering men frequently come from families in which their fathers battered their mothers. 
Battering men often are extremely jealous of their wives, and they tend to isolate their wives from 
other people. For example, a battering husband may refuse to permit his wife to handle checks or 
money, and he may take other measures to ensure that she spends most of her time in the home. 
Dr. Lenore Walker, a clinical psychologist, has concluded that there are three phases to the 
battered woman syndrome. During the first phase, which may last for an indefinite time, minor 
incidents of physical abuse occur as tension builds. The second, or acute stage, occurs when 
the husband loses control and inflicts a serious beating on his wife. A stage two incident may 
consist of prolonged beating that seriously injures or even kills the woman. Various factors, 
most of them seemingly quite trivial, tend to precipitate a stage two attack. For example, minor 
money disputes often result in acute battering incidents. Also, the battering man is often 
intoxicated at the time of a stage two incident. Pregnant women are particularly vulnerable, 
and stage two incidents often occur when a woman is in an advanced stage of pregnancy. 
Assuming that the woman survives the stage two incident, stage three is a loving stage. During 
this stage the husband appears to regret his battering behavior and to be a gentle, kind, and 
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with force. Yet because, from the perspective of a third person, she has an 
alternative to using force, under an objective analysis her decision to do so 
would be unreasonable. But since external factors render her choice to refrain 
from using force a non-choice, she believes her only option is to attack. This 
makes her decision to use force not purely voluntary or involuntary, but 
quasi-involuntary.104 
IV. THE SUBJECTIVE STANDARD IS MOST APPROPRIATE FOR REVIEWING A 
COMBATANT’S DECISION TO USE FORCE 
Currently, when reviewing a combatant’s decision to use force, military 
courts apply the Manual for Courts Martial (MCM) Rule 916(e).105 MCM 
Rule 916(e) follows the “dual standard” approach discussed above and 
contains both a subjective and objective prong.106 There are two primary 
reasons why assessing the reasonableness of a combatant’s use of force under 
the ROE from an objective standpoint is inappropriate. First, a combatant’s 
decision to use force when he or she perceives hostile intent is not purely 
voluntary, nor it is purely involuntary. This is because the combatant’s 
mission, the ROE itself, and the Uniform Code of Military Justice107 compel 
him to act when he perceives hostile intent. As with the battered woman’s 
defense, these factors—among others—make the combatant’s decision to use 
force quasi-involuntary, and thus at odds with the presumption of 
voluntariness implicit in the objective standard. Second, on a practical level, 
the ROE—which instructs service members to engage targets they believe 
exhibit hostile intent—calls on service members to engage in an ad hoc 
analysis, based on their own subjective impressions of the environment, 
before using force. These split-second decisions, made in high-intensity 
environments, are often difficult to reconstruct and review objectively. Thus, 
the subjective standard is the most functional way to analyze a service 
member’s perception of what constitutes hostile intent. 
 
caring man, thereby leading the woman to believe that perhaps he has repented. 
Id. at 11–12. 
104 See Heller, supra note 31, at 86–87. 
105 MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, RCM 916(e) (2012). See Bagwell, 
supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
106 Bagwell, supra note 30, at 12. 
107 See Article 92 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, which makes a failure to follow 
orders or obey regulations criminally punishable. 10 U.S.C. § 892 (2012). 
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A. THE USE OF FORCE IN COMBAT IS NOT ENTIRELY VOLUNTARY, 
MAKING THE OBJECTIVE STANDARD INAPPROPRIATE 
Just as the battered woman’s use of force falls somewhere on the 
spectrum between voluntary and involuntary action, the combatant’s use of 
force cannot be called truly voluntary or involuntary. It follows that, just as 
a subjective standard has been applied to battered spouses, so too should it 
be applied to combatants who use force in combat. Although the comparison 
between a battered woman’s use of force and a combatant’s use of force could 
be said to be factually distinguishable because combatants are aggressors 
who are often killing during offensive operations while battered woman are 
in a state of helplessness, this would be an oversimplification. The 
characteristics of a battered woman, including her fear of leaving her home 
and her perceived state of helplessness, are external factors that make her use 
of force decision quasi-involuntary. Similarly, there are many characteristics 
of a combatant’s decision to use force that make his decision quasi-voluntary. 
These include the characteristics of the ROE, the COIN battle space, the legal 
obligation to follow lawful orders and to perform his duty, and the 
combatant’s mission and expectation to kill. Thus, the quasi-involuntary 
nature of killing in combat makes such acts incompatible with the objective 
standard of reasonableness, which presumes a purely voluntary action has 
occurred.  
 A number of external factors impact a combatant’s decision to use force, 
making that decision not entirely voluntary. Although the combatant is still 
making a decision to use force, that determination is overborne by 
circumstances outside his control. First, service members have a legal 
obligation to perform their duty at whatever cost or face legal action.108 The 
 
108 Article 99 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice—titled “Misbehavior Before the 
Enemy”—provides the following: 
Any member of the armed forces who before or in the presence of the enemy— 
 (1) runs away; 
 (2) shamefully abandons, surrenders, or delivers up any command, unit, place, or military 
property which it is his duty to defend; 
 (3) through disobedience, neglect, or intentional misconduct endangers the safety of any such 
command, unit, place, or military property; 
 (4) casts away his arms or ammunition; 
 (5) is guilty of cowardly conduct; 
 (6) quits his place of duty to plunder or pillage; 
 (7) causes false alarms in any command, unit, or place under control of the armed forces; 
 (8) willfully fails to do his utmost to encounter, engage, capture, or destroy any enemy troops, 
combatants, vessels, aircraft, or any other thing, which it is his duty so to encounter, engage, 
capture, or destroy; or  
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current ROE itself creates an obligation, stating, “[u]nit commanders always 
retain the inherent right and obligation to exercise unit self-defense in 
response to a hostile act or demonstration of hostile intent.”109 Thus, the ROE 
not only dictates standards for the use of force, but it explicitly compels 
combatants to use deadly force when they perceive “hostile intent.” A failure 
to use force when the ROE authorizes it may result in the service member 
being punished criminally.110 Hence, much like the battered woman who 
faces an involuntary decisionmaking process, a service member has no purely 
voluntary course of action when he honestly in fact believes he is observing 
hostile intent. 
Although criminal punishment for failing to engage is likely not on the 
forefront of a combatant’s mind before firing, the mission often is. And the 
mission of the combatant reflects the same obligation that the law does: to 
kill the enemy. While many aspects of the military have changed with 
advances in technology, the role of the ground combatant remains relatively 
primitive and untouched.111 According to the United States Marine Corps 
Field Manual, the mission of the Marine Corps rifle squad is to “locate, close 
with, and destroy the enemy by fire and maneuver, or repel the enemy’s 
assault by fire and close combat.”112 The plain language of this mission 
statement reflects a commander’s expectation for combat forces to use deadly 
force against the enemy whenever possible. Again, if a service member fails 
to meet this expectation, they may be punished under the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice.113 But the more important consequence of this mission 
 
 (9) does not afford all practicable relief and assistance to any troops, combatants, vessels, or 
aircraft of the armed forces belonging to the United States or their allies when engaged in battle; 
shall be punished by death or such other punishment as a court-martial may direct. 
10 U.S.C. § 899 (2012) (emphasis added); see also United States v. King, NMCCA 
200401338, 2006 WL 4573018, at *1 (N.M. Ct. Crim. App. Nov. 14,  2006) (affirming the 
conviction of a Marine under Article 99 for “misbehavior before the enemy” because he 
refused to provide security for a convoy in Iraq, out of fear of death). 
109 Montalvo, supra note 15, at 31 (emphasis added). 
110 Maj. Mark S. Martins, Rules of Engagement for Land Forces: A Matter of Training, 
Not Lawyering, 143 MIL. L. REV. 1, 61 (1994) (noting that Article 92 of the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice, which makes a failure to obey a lawful order or directive criminally 
punishable, provides a channel for which the ROE becomes criminally enforceable). 
111 See David Wood, Modern Warfare Is Testing an Old U.S. Weapon: The Infantryman, 
FREE REPUBLIC (Dec. 6, 2002), http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/804218/posts, 
archived at http://perma.cc/U9Z3-3FQE. 
112 U.S. MARINE CORPS, PCN 143 000112 00, MARINE RIFLE SQUAD at 1-1 (rev. ed. 
1997), available at http://www.marines.mil/Portals/59/Publications/MCWP%203-11.2%20
Marine%20Rifle%20Squad.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/JQC4-WXXU. 
113 See United States v. King, NMCCA 200401338, 2006 WL 4573018, at *1 (N-M Ct. 
Crim. App. Nov. 14, 2006) (affirming the conviction and sentence of a marine serving in Al 
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statement is that every time a properly trained infantry Marine leaves friendly 
lines to go on a combat patrol, there is an implied order to seek contact with 
the enemy and to use deadly force against him or her whenever possible.114 
As a consequence of the combatant’s mission, society’s expectations of 
him or her in combat are functionally different from the expectations placed 
on civilians in a self-defense scenario. This distinction is grounded both in 
common sense and doctrine: the combatant has a legal obligation to 
proactively seek violent contact with the enemy, while the civilian in the self-
defense context has an obligation to retreat whenever possible.115 The 
important implication of this is that when a civilian chooses to use to use 
deadly force in self-defense, he should have first considered retreating—
which makes his decision to use force purely voluntary. Yet much like 
battered women, service members do not have the opportunity to retreat. The 
service member’s legal obligation to his mission and unit compels him to 
seek contact with the enemy and use deadly force against him whenever the 
opportunity presents itself. These obligations leave the combatant no other 
option but to use deadly force when he honestly in fact believes he has 
observed hostile intent. Just as in the case with the battered woman, this is 
not a purely voluntary action and cannot be analyzed adequately from an 
objective standpoint. 
When looking at the purposes of criminal punishment, this approach 
makes sense. The criminal law specifically punishes only voluntary action to 
further the twin aims of punishment: (1) deterrence and (2) retribution.116 
First, no deterrence function is served by punishing quasi-involuntary action 
because if the defendant believes he or she has no other option available, no 
amount of punishment will deter his or her conduct.117 In the case of the 
service member who honestly in fact believes he is observing hostile intent, 
 
Anbar Province, Iraq who refused to provide security for a convoy and was sentenced to a year 
in prison and given a bad-conduct discharge). 
114 According to Article 99 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, a service member 
who “willfully fails to do his utmost to encounter, engage, capture, or destroy any enemy 
troops, combatants, vessels, aircraft, or any other thing, which it is his duty so to encounter, 
engage, capture, or destroy . . . shall be punished by death or such other punishment as a court-
martial may direct.” 10 U.S.C. § 899(8) (2012). 
115 See Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228, 230 (1987) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment 
does not prohibit placing the burden on the defendant to prove that she “did not violate a duty 
to retreat or avoid danger” in order to establish a claim of self-defense).  
116 Heller, supra note 31, at 13, 60. The subjective standard best serves the “twin aims” of 
criminal punishment: deterrence and retribution. Id. at 60. If a person acts involuntarily, no 
amount of punishment will be able to effectively deter the conduct. Id. Additionally, punishing 
defendants for involuntary action violates the retributive principle of proportionality. Id. 
117 Id. at 60. 
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he must use force because if he fails to do so he will not have remained 
faithful to his mission, he will have endangered others, and in extreme cases 
he could be punished criminally. Thus, he is bound both morally and legally 
to use deadly force whenever “hostile intent” is identified. 
Second, punishing involuntary action does not further the retributive 
goals of the criminal law. A fundamental principle of retribution is 
proportionality.118 Severely punishing service members, who act quasi-
involuntarily with the good-faith belief that they are following orders and 
fulfilling their moral and legal obligations to their command, is grossly 
disproportionate. The drafters of the Model Penal Code reflected this same 
view in the Code’s comments indicating that “punishing defendants who 
honestly but unreasonably kill in self-defense just as severely as defendants 
who kill in cold-blood violates the basic retributive principle that criminals 
should be protected against”119 “excessive, disproportionate, or arbitrary 
punishment.”120 Thus, because a combatant has no purely voluntary course 
of action when he or she honestly in fact believes they are observing hostile 
intent, criminal punishment is inappropriate. 
B. BECAUSE THE DECISION TO USE FORCE IS SUBJECTIVE, 
EVALUATING IT FROM AN OBJECTIVE STANDARD IS 
INAPPROPRIATE 
The quasi-involuntary nature of the combatant’s decision use of force is 
further complicated by the ROE itself because that decision to use force is 
one that is explicitly based on his subjective perceptions. This concept is 
plainly reflected in the ROE’s definition of “hostile intent,” as it was 
intentionally designed to take into consideration the service member’s 
subjective perceptions of the battle space, in response to the obscure nature 
of the COIN environment.121 Accordingly, it logically follows the standard 
criminal courts apply when reviewing the reasonableness of a service 
member’s use of force should adapt as well, and also be made purely 
subjective. 
The ROE, discussed above, indicates that the key to finding “hostile 
intent,” which authorizes deadly force, is finding “imminency.”122 However, 
the ROE also states that “imminen[ce] will be based on an assessment of all 
 
118 See id. 
119 Id. 
120 MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 1.02(2)(c) (Official Draft and Revised 
Comments 1980). 
121 See supra Part I. 
122 See Montalvo, supra note 15, at 26, 28.  
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facts and circumstances known to U.S. forces at the time and may be made 
at any level,” where “[i]mminent does not necessarily mean immediate or 
instantaneous.”123 Thus, the language in the definition of “hostile intent” 
indicates the determination of a service member’s use of force is a subjective 
one.  
This subjective analysis is bound to cause confusion among service 
members in borderline cases, and it is those cases that place troops in the 
most precarious position. Several recent cases highlight the problems 
associated with courts reviewing this subjective analysis from an objective 
standpoint.  
Take, for example, the case of Army First Lieutenant Clint Lorance, 
who, in August 2013, was convicted of murder after he ordered his men to 
engage two suspected Taliban fighters whom he believed exhibited “hostile 
intent.”124 Just prior to the shooting, which occurred in July of 2012 in 
Kandahar, Afghanistan, Lorance had taken command of his platoon as a 
combat replacement after the previous leader was wounded in action and sent 
home.125 On the day of the shooting, Lorance led his platoon on a patrol into 
a village where they had made contact with the enemy a few days prior. Upon 
leaving his base, intelligence assets reported that radio interceptions indicated 
enemy forces were watching his patrol.126 As the platoon moved closer to the 
village, the prevalence of improvised explosive devices required Lorance and 
his platoon to travel single-file down a narrow route, making them vulnerable 
to attack.127 While making their way through the mine-littered landscape, 
Lorance spotted three men on motorcycles approaching his patrol at a high 
rate of speed.128 The men ignored orders to stop and proceeded towards the 
patrol.129 According to Lorance, intelligence indicated that the Taliban 
routinely used motorcycles to monitor patrol movements and engage friendly 
forces.130 In fact, two Afghanistan National Army Soldiers in the area had 
recently been killed by two males riding on a motorcycle.131 With only 
 
123 Id. at 35.  
124 Associated Press, supra note 25. 
125 Memorandum from John N. Maher, Attorney for Clint Lorance, on Rule for Court-
Martial 1105 Submission to Commanding General of the 82nd Airborne Division at 1–2 (Aug. 
15, 2014), available at http://nebula.wsimg.com/277002cece417b09c5828724f1394dc
3?AccessKeyId=2A131D7BE2224E13EBB0&disposition=0&alloworigin=1, archived at 
http://perma.cc/Y9BD-PGQK. 
126 Id. at 2. 
127 Id. at 5. 
128 Id. 
129 Id. 
130 Id. at 3. 
131 Id. 
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moments to decide how to best protect his exposed patrol, based on the above 
information, he ordered a soldier to engage the three men.132 The soldier 
killed two of them and wounded the third.133 The soldier who engaged would 
later testify at trial that when he pulled the trigger, based on the threat 
presented, he felt an obligation to protect American forces.134 
Notwithstanding this testimony, Lorance was subsequently convicted of 
murder for ordering the soldier to engage.  
Whether or not the facts available to Lorance at the time of the shooting 
amount to “hostile intent” may not be clear to an objectively reasonable 
person. But based on the ROE’s definition of hostile intent, and given his 
legal responsibility to use force to perform his mission, Lorance’s order could 
be reasonable from a subjective perspective, if one assumes he acted in good 
faith. 
In order to better understand Lorance’s decisionmaking process, his 
other possible courses of action should be considered. First, Lorance could 
have chosen not to engage the suspected Taliban. The consequences of this 
choice are obvious: if they were walking into an ambush, like Lorance 
believed, a failure to act—or a delay in acting—could potentially result in his 
soldiers being seriously wounded or killed. Alternatively, Lorance could 
have decided to retreat in the face of uncertainty and return to a secure 
position. Not only is this counter to the mission of the ground combatant, 
discussed above, in doing so he could in theory possibly be subject to 
punishment under Article 99 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.135 
Ultimately, his ability to lead in combat would have been put into question, 
as he essentially would have abandoned his mission. Neither of the above 
options are realistically viable for a combatant, nor should they be. 
Given the facts available to Lorance at the time, it seems plausible that 
Lorance honestly believed his platoon faced imminent contact with the 
enemy. But more importantly, his case provides an example of how there is 
often no clear “right” decision in combat. Combatants, and small-unit leaders 
especially, are forced to make the best decision based on the information 
available to them at the time and keep moving forward. Unfortunately, with 
the clarity of hindsight, a decision made on the ground may later appear 
objectively unreasonable. Leaders are forced to deal with the consequences 
of these good-faith errors, as the death of teammates, innocent civilians, and 
 
132 Id. at 6. 
133 Id. at 2. 
134 Id. at 6. 
135 See supra note 114 and accompanying text. 
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the burden of self-perceived failure are consequences that may be carried by 
service members for a lifetime. 
To hold these same individuals criminally accountable for good-faith 
errors made in the heat of combat, because from the safety of a courtroom 
their errors may appear objectively unreasonable, is incompatible with the 
ambiguous definition of hostile intent that is based on the combatant’s 
subjective impression of his environment. Moreover, these borderline use-
of-force cases are not the product of morally culpable, purely voluntary 
actions that the criminal law seeks to punish. Rather, they are the product of 
an ambiguous ROE that is applied in a highly contextual COIN environment 
by service members who are acting in compliance with their mission and 
legal obligation to obey orders. A purely subjective standard of 
reasonableness gives American forces the legal deference they deserve while 
allowing the courts to punish those troops who use deadly force when they 
know the ROE does not authorize such action. 
V. POLICY CONCERNS 
Given the political undertones with all military conflict, a subjective 
standard of reasonableness is bound to raise concerns among military 
commanders, legal commentators, and the public. These concerns are 
addressed in part below. 
First, military commanders are, above all, the most concerned with 
mission accomplishment. In the COIN environment, as discussed in Part I, 
this in part means winning the support of the local population. Excessive 
civilian casualties erode this support, thus directly impeding mission 
accomplishment. Yet commanders cannot assume that prosecuting service 
members who in good faith believed they were acting in compliance with the 
ROE will reduce civilian casualties. Soldiers and Marines are taught there is 
an expectation to use deadly force against perceived threats, and the ROE 
compels them to do so when they identify a hostile act or hostile intent. Thus, 
a soldier who in good faith believes his life, or the life of his teammate, is in 
danger will always resort to force, notwithstanding a criminal prosecution.136 
The proffered deterrence justification is further belied by the fact that a major 
source of civilian casualties appears to be supporting arms, both of which are 
relatively uninfluenced by the prosecutions of ground personnel.137 
 
136 See Montalvo, supra note 15, at 32. Major Montalvo himself, who advocates for 
punishing service members who violate the ROE in good faith, notes that a prominent ground 
commander in Iraq stated he did not know “a Marine . . . who would not pull the trigger when 
their life was truly in danger.” Id. 
137 See Nichols, supra note 24, and accompanying text. 
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If reducing civilian casualties were a commander’s primary goal, it 
could be achieved by altering the ROE itself and returning to the traditional 
form of imminence in place before 2005.138 Doing so would remove some of 
the ambiguity associated with the current ROE and would make assessing 
conduct under the ROE from an objective standpoint more tenable. But this 
reduces the ability for forces to protect themselves in the COIN environment, 
which requires forces to engage in some form of conduct-based targeting.139 
Given that future conflicts will likely require troops to continue to engage in 
COIN, and thus conduct-based targeting, the structure of the current ROE, 
which evolved to accommodate the austerity of operating in that 
environment, is likely to remain unchanged. If the ROE is unlikely to revert 
back to its original form, it is logical for the reasonableness standard of a 
combatant’s use of force to also evolve. A purely subjective standard would 
best accommodate this change in targeting doctrine.  
Second, legal commentators and the public would likely be concerned 
that a purely subjective standard of reasonableness will weaken the force of 
military law in combat and make holding ROE violators accountable more 
difficult. Again, this is an oversimplification. Aside from minor regulatory 
offenses, the criminal law only seeks to hold accountable those individuals 
who engaged in purely voluntary actions with a culpable state of mind. For 
service members who acted in good faith in accordance with the ROE, they 
are neither acting completely voluntarily nor with a culpable state of mind. 
And considering the use of force in combat is quasi-involuntary, any 
deterrence effect is negligible at best. More importantly, those service 
members who used force in bad faith and who did not honestly believe the 
use of force was necessary would still be convicted even when their conduct 
is analyzed under the subjective standard. 
In fact, holding individuals accountable for good-faith conduct under 
the ROE may weaken the force of military criminal law. In the public’s eye, 
many of these ROE prosecutions are politically motivated, which makes the 
military judicial system appear susceptible to political winds of change and 
command influence.140 In the past, these political winds have caused some 
 
138 See Montalvo, supra note 15, at 32. 
139 See id. at 27. 
140 See Tom Bowman, Case of Marines Desecrating Taliban Bodies Takes a New Twist, 
NPR.ORG (Oct. 31, 2013, 4:00 AM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/parallels/2013/10/31/
241880851/a-marine-controversy-in-afghanistan-takes-a-new-twist, archived at http://perma.
cc/C29Z-J73U (noting that unlawful command influence is the “mortal enemy of military 
justice”); Darlene M Iskra, Is This Really “Unlawful Command Influence”?, TIME (Jun. 21, 
2013), http://nation.time.com/2013/06/21/is-this-really-unlawful-command-influence/, 
archived at http://perma.cc/V8N5-PMJ2. 
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commanders to hastily condemn the use of force by American troops before 
an adequate investigation has been completed.141 Once the subsequent 
investigation reveals that condemnation was in fact unjustified, it makes the 
condemning authority appear foolish, biased, and unjust. This subsequently 
could make the prosecution of culpable ROE violators more difficult because 
the commander’s overzealousness fosters a presumption of illegitimacy in 
ROE investigations, notwithstanding the culpability of the shooter. If legal 
commentators are concerned with the strength of military law, they should 
seek ways to promote its legitimacy. By refraining from over-zealously 
prosecuting service members who act in good faith, and focusing on those 
that act in bad faith, commanders and members of the JAG Corps will be able 
to improve the military’s reputation as a neutral pursuer of justice. 
CONCLUSION 
The way the United States fights conflicts has forever been changed by 
the country’s engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan. Accordingly, the Rules 
of Engagement were changed to match the COIN environment’s necessity 
for conduct-based targeting. The rule of law, MCMR 916(e), a traditional 
self-defense standard, which governs the reasonableness of a service 
member’s use of force in combat needs to change as well. A purely subjective 
standard for reviewing reasonableness—one that hinges on the service 
member proving that he honestly and in fact believed he was in imminent 
threat of a hostile act or hostile intent—is best suited for alleged ROE 
violations. 
Applying an objective standard is at odds with both the situation on the 
ground in America’s current conflicts and the voluntariness requirement of 
criminal law. A combatant’s good-faith use of force in combat under the ROE 
is quasi-involuntary, in that the service member is compelled by both ethos 
and the law to fulfill his or her sworn legal obligation to teammates, superiors, 
and his or her country when he perceives hostile intent. Analyzing the 
reasonableness of a service member’s use of force with a purely subjective 
standard will allow military courts to avoid running against the presumption 
of voluntariness embedded in the objective standard, and match the standard 
of review of force under the ROE to the ROE itself—the application of which 
hinges on the service member’s subjective perception of an oftentimes 
rapidly developing situation.  
 
141 See, e.g., Andrew deGrandpre, Task Force Violent: The Unforgiven: Part 1, MILITARY 
TIMES, http://www.militarytimes.com/story/military/2015/03/04/task-force-violent-the-
unforgiven/23940295/ (last visited Mar. 24, 2015), archived at http:// perma.cc/E5UY-3CJ8. 
4. LAGUNA (FINAL TO PRINTER) (AUGUST 18 CORRECTION) 7/20/2016  
2015] A GRUNT’S PERSPECTIVE 461 
Most importantly, the mission, the combatant, and the law will be better 
served by the subjective standard. By prosecuting only those Marines, 
Soldiers, Sailors, and Airmen who act in bad faith, commanders will remain 
consistent with the principles of counterinsurgency that call for maximum 
protection of civilians, while also allowing service members to adequately 
protect themselves. And for people that are willing to sacrifice their lives to 
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